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BOOK REVIEWS
MONEY IN THE LAW. By ARTHuR1 NUSSBAUM. Chicago: THE
FOUNDATION PRESS, 1939. Pp. 515.
Had Professor Nussbaum written this book on money before the
outbreak of the Great War of 1914, its publication would probably not
have attracted as much attention from the legal profession as it is now
certain to do. Because of the unparalleled relative stability of economic
and monetary conditions which characterized the period ending with
the World War, lawyers of the pre-War period did not regard money
"as a problem of paramount importance, but as an established fact"',
and did not find legal problems of money exciting enough to write
about. It is, therefore, not surprising that the classic treatments on
money by Savigny and Gustav Hartman (1868) had scarcely any suc-
cessors on the continent2 nor any counterpart in the Anglo-American
legal literature. It needed the great monetary disturbances which fol-
lowed the World War to change this attitude. Problems of money
were no longer interesting only to the economist; they became fas-
cinating even to the lawyer. This change of attitude produced on the
continent a considerable number of monographs (among which Mr.
Nussbaum's book, Das Geld, appearing in 1925, is the most outstand-
ing) and in America, excellent articles. The English literature pre-
sented us with Mr. Feavearyear's book on The Pound Sterling (1931)
and, shortly before the appearance of Mr. Nussbaum's book, with Mr.
Mann's excellent monograph on The Legal Aspect of Money (1938).
The Anglo-American literature, however, failed to produce a compre-
hensive treatise. This gap has now been filled by Mr. Nussbaum, a
scholar eminently qualified for this undertaking. This new book is by
no means a translation of his former work. He has made rich use of
our experience since 1925 and he has focused his attention on Anglo-
American law without giving up the comparative law approach already
used in his earlier book. This is very fortunate indeed. There is no
field in law where the comparative law approach can be used to greater
advantage. It enables the Anglo-American lawyer to profit by the ex-
perience of others, a procedure for which he has a precedent in the atti-
tude of Sir John Davis, who decided the famous case De Mist Moneys
in 1604, on the basis of continental theories.
'MANN, THE LEGAL AsPEcT OF MONEY (1938) V.
'M. WOLFF'S, DAS GELD in 4 (1) EHRENSBEReG'S HANDBUCH DES HANDELS-
RECHTS 563, which appeared in 1917, is the outstanding monograph written in the
pre-War tradition.
Gilbert v. Ireland, Davis's (Ireland) 18, 2 State Trials 114, 80 Eng. Rep. 507(1605).
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Mr. Nussbaum's book is of an astounding comprehensiveness:
The first three chapters are devoted to Basic Monetary Conceptions in
Law (Ch. 1), Kinds of Money (Ch. 2), and The Monetary System
(Ch. 3). The remaining five chapters are devoted to Debts in General
(Ch. 4), Debts under Fluctuating Currencies (Ch. 5), Gold Clauses
and Other Protective Clauses (Ch. 6), Foreign Currency Debts (Ch.
7), and Debts under Exchange Control (Ch. 8).
Mr. Nussbaum is an adherent of the "society" theory of money,
as a fascinating section of the first chapter on "Money of the State"
(pp. 23-36) clearly shows. According to this theory which had already
been advocated by Savigny, it is not the state, but "ultimately society
and custom that decide whether coin and paper will function as and so
be money." (p. 28) Although it is true, Mr. Nussbaum concedes, that
ordinarily the state has and exercises full power over the currency, past
experience with fiat money destroyed by complete depreciation shows
that there are limitations on the monetary power of the state. This is
undoubtedly true as the history of French assignats, American conti-
nentals and German marks tells us. It is also true that courts, Anglo-
American as well as continental, have been forced quite frequently by
the pressure of society to recognize the monetary character of private
currency in emergency situations, as, for instance, when there was a
great scarcity of small coins because of rapid inflation. Still, I submit
that the contrast between the two theories is over-emphasized. G. F.
Knapp, the most famous protagonist of the state theory of money, re-
garded the state only as the regular and oldest type of a payment com-
munity and admitted that any other payment community may create
money of its own. The state, not as a state, but "bceause it is a pay-
society, can create a unit of value for itself".4 If this explanation is
taken into account, the state theory of money is the expression of a very
realistic insight. Since the modern state is the most important receiver
and maker of payments, the attitude of the pay offices of the state with
respect to the media of payment they take and force upon the public is
a matter of prime importance for the monetary system.5 I also fail to
agree with the learned author's contention that the state theory of
money prevails in German decisions. The German Reichsgericht has
recognized the monetary character of emergency money as Mr. Nuss-
baum himself admits. One of the decisions of the Reichsgericht, which
Mr. Nussbaum cites (96 RGZ 262) used the state theory of money only
' KNAPP, THE STATE THEORY OF MONEY (1924) 128.
'The best discussion of KNAPP's STATE THEORY OF MONEY is to be found in
Max Weber's Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, 3 GRiNDISS DER SOZIAL6ONOMIE (2d
ed. 1925), 40 et seq, 109 et seq., and in PALYI, DER STREIT UM DIE STAATLICHE
THEOm DES GELDES (1922).
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by way of obiter dictum where it allowed a Swiss creditor to collect
depreciation damages from his German debtor who had defaulted be-
cause the Swiss creditor had suffered damages in Switzerland on ac-
count of the depreciation of the German mark which was only a com-
modity and not a measure of value in Switzerland. In the course of
the opinion, the Reichsgericht remarked that "money is a measure of
value and medium of payment only by virtue of the command of the
state and only within the limits of the state's territory."
The second chapter of the book contains a fascinating discussion
of the Portuguese banknote case (pp. 93-99). Chapter 3, dealing with
the colonial antecedents, the legal history of the dollar, the present dol-
lar and the constitutional aspects of the American monetary system is
particularly deserving of attention. Chapter 5, dealing with debts un-
der fluctuating currency (pp. 249 et seq.) is especially good reading.
It contains a very vivid account of the ghastly development of the Ger-
man inflation and the revaluation efforts of the German Reichsgericht
and of the German legislature. Mr. Nussbaum is very outspoken in his
condemnation of the efforts of the Reichsgericht to stem the tide of the
inflation. 6 He claims that it would be "difficult to find in the legal his-
tory of the great countries of Western civilization a similar instance of
such thoroughgoing aberration and confusion" (p. 277). The revalua-
tion doctrine of the Reichsgericht in its confusion of ethical with legal
considerations can be accounted for, the author tells us, only by its
sociological background. The German Reichsgericht, when abandon-
ing the principle that mark equals mark, was the spokesman of the Ger-
man Bourgeois middle class which resented the entire destruction of its
savings; and the middle class, through the Reichsgericht, imposed its
will upon the government. No justification for the attitude of the
Reichsgericht can be found, Mr. Nussbaum asserts, in the theory of
"revolutionary emergency law" because "an emergency situation does
not confer revolutionary powers upon ordinary law courts. On the con-
trary, it is during just such emergency situations, that the law should
be cherished and defended by the courts." These quotations, interesting
as they are, might be misleading. They might be interpreted as an in-
dication of a difference in attitude between continental and American
lawyers as to the division of powers between courts and legislature. I
personally feel quite differently towards the attitude of the German
Reichsgericht, so harshly condemned by Mr. Nussbaum. First, I doubt
very much whether the Reichsgericht really usurped legislative powers.
The provision of the German Civil Code that obligations have to be
'Mr. Nussbaum had already voiced these criticisms in Germanr in his mono-
graph, BILANz DER AUFWERTUNGSTHEORrE (1929).
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performed in good faith, gave, in my opinion, a sufficient basis for the
decision of the German Reichsgericha.7 Second, even if we grant that
the Reichsgericht had taken over legislative powers, it would only prove
that the traditional view, to the effect that the German system is based
on a clear-cut separation of legislative and judicial power, has proved
to be false. In the last analysis, every interpretation of a statute is a
legislative act.
Mr. Nussbaum is-as the review has already indicated-a nom-
inalist. The extent of monetary obligations is independent of the
functional value of money, particularly its purchasing power. (pp. 249
et seq.) However, he concedes that the nominalistic theory is properly
applicable only to obligations calling for liquid claims; in the field of
unliquidated claims, such as claims for damages, the nominalistic view
is not compelling. Those claims are adaptable to a serious change in
the purchasing power. However, Mr. Nussbaum does not go so far
as to extend his qualification to executory bilateral contracts. He seems
to be in favor of applying the nominalistic theory here as his discourse
of Willard v. Tayloe8 shows (p. 263). The basis of his attitude again
is his philosophy as to the distinction between judicial and legislative
function.
It is undoubtedly true that the nominalistic theory of debts has
been voiced by many courts, both Anglo-American and continental, but
the problem remains to justify the theory. For Mr. Nussbaum, the
explanation of nominalism lies in the basic concept of money. Ac-
cording to him, money differs from other fungibles "in that its compo-
sition is legally irrelevant". "Only the relationship of the money piece
to a certain ideal unit (dollar, pound sterling, franc, mark, etc.) has legal
relevancy, inasmuch as the thing is treated as money and not as a mere
piece of metal or a scrap of paper." (p. 5). It is "a thing which, irrespec-
tive of its composition is, by common usage, treated as a fraction, integer
or multiple of an ideal unit." (p. 5).
On this money concept, he bases his theory of monetary debts
which, according to him, call for a sum of ideal units (units of account).
Since a debt "is defined by its monetary unit, together with the figure
that accompanies it," he concludes that "changes in the monetary field
which have no bearing either upon such unit or figure do not affect the
debt" and this is "particularly true," according to the author, "of
changes affecting the metal value, purchasing power, or rate of exchange
of the unit." I submit that this reasoning is neither convincing nor ex-
haustive. It is not difficult to make out an equally good case for
CrIL CODE §§ 157, 242.8 75 U. S. 557 (1869).
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valorism by regarding the transfer of purchasing power as the charac-
teristic feature of a monetary debt.9 What are, then, the reasons which
have motivated so many courts to take a nominalistic point of view.
Certainly one of the reasons, and a very compelling one, is expediency.
It is quite impossible to take account of every fluctuation in the pur-
chasing power of money. Also, an abandoning of nominalism would
raise the difficult question as to whether changes in the purchasing
power of money not originating from credit expansion or contraction
are to be taken into account.10 But these reasons of expediency ceased
to be compelling in times of severe depreciation. Our experience with
severe depreciations has also made evident the illusory character of
Knapp's justification of nominalism based on the "amphitropic" posi-
tion of each individual, namely, the fact that each individual is debtor
as well as creditor." This theory reflects the monetary stability of the
pre-War period.
Is it justifiable to put the risk of even a severe depreciation on the
creditor? The most interesting effort to justify nominalism, even in the
case of a severe depreciation (caused by the issuance of greenbacks) is
to be found in Justice Strong's opinion in Knox v. Lee, one of the
Legal Tender Cases.
"It was not a duty to pay gold or silver, or the kind of money recognized
by law at the time when the contract was made, nor was it a duty to pay
money of equal intrinsic value in the market. . . .The expectation of the
creditor and the anticipation of the debtor may have been that the contract
would be discharged by the payment of coined metals, but neither the expecta-
tion of one party to the contract respecting its fruits, nor the anticipation of
the other constitutes its obligation. There is a well-recognized distinction
between the expectation of the parties to a contract and the duty imposed by
it. Were it not so the expectation of results would be always equivalent to a
binding engagement that they should follow. But the obligation of a contract
to pay money is to pay that which the law shall recognize as money when
the payment is to be made."'
But even this theory may lose its persuasive force in the collapse of
the monetary system. It has been argued (for instance by Cassel) that
nominalism is necessary to keep the official currency in circulation.
This argument also is not convincing, although it contains some truth.
The legal tender quality of money is probably an important factor in
keeping fiat money in circulation. But the legal tender legislation does
not in itself determine the quantum of money to be paid as Dawson and
'EcxsTEIN, GELDSCHULD UND GELDWERT (1932).
10 MANN, op. cit. mupra note 1, at 63.
n KNAPP, op. cit. smpra note 5, at 48.
12 Wall. 457, 548 (U. S. 1870).
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Cooper have convincingly shown.' 3  It is also not true-as a German
court had it-that "without nominalism, capitalism is inconceivable".
However, it is arguable that nominalism has a very important function
in a society, the equilibrium of which has been reached at a point of un-
der employment. It makes it possible for the government to try to
raise employment by credit expansion. On the other hand, it is quite
interesting to notice, a very thoughtful writer has pointed out that
nominalism does not have the character of "jus cogens". 4 On the con-
trary, parties, if they wish to do so, have the right to protect themselves
against fluctuations of the purchasing power of money, by gold clauses
or by referring to commodity price indices. 5 Nominalism and valorism,
it seems, are both "correct" theories within their limitations. It is im-
possible to take sides in the controversy as long as the social and economic
implications of either theory have not been clearly elaborated.
It would take the space of another review to discuss adequately the
remaining chapters of the book dealing with gold and other protective
clauses, foreign currency debts and debts under exchange contr6l. The
subject-matter covered in these chapters bristles with many and very in-
tricate problems. The author handles them with fine craftsmanship.
Mr. Nussbaum's book exhibits an unusual erudition and it is extra-
ordinarily stimulating. Any legal scholar or practicing lawyer who has
to deal with the many legal problems relating to money will find Mr.
Nussbaum's book indispensable and of invaluable assistance.
FRE=RicH KESSLER*
CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS. By HENRY
WINTHROP BALLANTINE and NORMAN DUNHAM LATTIN. Chicago:
CALLAGHAN & Co. 1939. pp. xxxii, 917.
This latest accession to the array of casebooks now available in the
field of corporations and other business organizations is an excellent
piece of work. It covers the main topics familiarly dealt with in a first
course in corporations, such as the formation of corporations, the limi-
tations on the use of the separate entity privilege, criminal and tort
' The Effect of the Inflation on Private Contracts: United States, 1861-1879
(1935) 33 Mrca. L. REv. 852, 904 ff.
'" ECKSTEIN, op. cit. supra note 9, at 74; MANN, op. cit. supra note 1 at 61, n. 4.
' That this does not mean that a creditor has a "constitutional right" to pro-
tect himself by gold clauses, is illustrated by Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio Ry. Co.,
294 U. S. 240 (1935), upholding the constitutionality of the Joint Resolution of
June 5, 1933.
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School.
